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Introduction: War and the idea of Europe  
 
In the last volume of his monumental Jean-Christophe, published in 1912, Romain Rolland 
lingered on a disturbing change unsettling European society: 
 
The fire smouldering in the forest of Europe was beginning to burst into flames. In vain 
did they try to put it out in one place; it only broke out in another. With gusts of smoke 
and a shower of sparks it swept from one point to another, burning the dry brushwood. 
[…] The whole of Europe, that Europe that only yesterday was sceptical and apathetic, 
like a dead wood, was swept by the flames. All men were possessed by the desire for 
battle. War was ever on the point of breaking out. It was stamped out, but it sprang to life 
again. […] Europe looked like a vast armed vigil.1  
 
It was an accurate premonition; and it was shared by others. In 1913, Carl Gustav Jung’s 
nightmares of a tremendous flood covering the whole of Europe, a land devastated ‘by yellow 
2 
 
 
waves, swimming rubble, and the death of countless thousands’, and Ludwig Meidner’s 
‘Apokalyptische Stadt’, offering the viewers a burning and devastated city, both announced 
the impending catastrophe that would soon tear Europe apart.2 From around 1900 onwards, 
the feeling of impending doom came to be shared by an increasing number of writers, artists, 
and intellectuals. Many of them, belonging to avant-gardes and arrière-gardes alike, were 
eager to welcome it.3 As Rolland noted, Europe seemed possessed by a seemingly 
inexplicable lust for war, violence, and revolt. The acceptance of an inevitable decadence or 
decline, so popular in intellectual circles from the 1870s to the 1890s, had gradually receded, 
giving space to a yearning for action. A desire for great men and heroic deeds became 
widespread. Violence seemed the solution to Europe’s predicaments: the only way to arrest 
its decline.  
The place of warfare violence in the history of ideas, images, and representations of 
Europe is an aspect often overlooked by historians. Partly, this has been a consequence of the 
prominent role played by the liberal discourse about Europe. In the works of a variegated 
array of liberal thinkers that includes the Baron de Montesquieu, François Guizot, and 
Benedetto Croce, Europe has been by definition the place of liberty, usually contrasted with 
Asia as the land of despotism. Consistently, its history has been the story of the unfolding of 
freedom – however imperfect – and of the attainment of perpetual peace – despite the many 
drawbacks. Progress would inevitably lead to a pacified and prosperous Europe. In some 
cases, as in Richard Cobden’s popular version, peace was preceded or accompanied by some 
sort of economic unification. In this important vulgate, practical reason and economic 
interests would eventually lead to a European federation ending all wars. While this has been 
one of the most important discourses about European identity – not least for political 
convenience – others, less popular yet more disenchanted and realistic, considered Europe as 
the place where, despite unending massacres – or, perhaps, because of them – politicians, 
3 
 
 
intellectuals, and diplomats have relentlessly tried to tame war violence. Carl Schmitt took 
such a view in his Der Nomos der Erde (1950). According to the German scholar, the 
emergence of the Jus Publicum Europaeum in the early modern age shaped a space in which 
violence between states was somehow limited through the recognition of the justis hostis, that 
is, the legitimate enemy. It was a crucial distancing from previous images of the enemy, 
which, inspired by religion, saw him as the embodiment of all evil. However, this also 
produced a space, outside Europe, with no laws or rules; a space waiting to be conquered and 
exploited; a space where the most atrocious violence against the unfaithful or the uncivilized 
was deemed legitimate.4 From such a standpoint, the containment of war violence, rather than 
the suppression of war itself, might be the thread offering some coherence to European 
history. But the recognition that war has always been a constant element in defining 
perceptions of European identity might lead to a very different narrative. Writing shortly 
before the outbreak of the First World War, the French philosopher Georges Sorel noted that 
Europe, a space inhabited by so many different peoples with conflicting interests, aspirations, 
and ways of life, had always been the place of ‘warlike cataclysms’. He noted, with bitter 
irony, that the ‘people of Europe can be united only by one, single idea: to wage war one 
against another’.5 Certainly, Sorel’s was a sarcastic quip; but the notion that war might have 
shaped a feeling of Europeanness has recently been suggested by some scholars. Their claim 
is that through modern warfare Europe has become something very real for thousands and 
even millions of the middle and lower classes fighting on battlefields throughout the Old 
Continent.6 In the process, its invading armies carried with them ideas, values, and ways of 
life that helped to create shared forms of a European existence. Placing the pursuit of 
perpetual peace or attempts to tame its violence at the heart of European discourses, or even 
seeing war as an element shaping a common feeling of Europeanness, leads to three different 
visions of Europe. And yet, crucially, these are not mutually exclusive. Tellingly, in his Arte 
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della Guerra, Machiavelli derived the moral superiority of Europe and the love for freedom 
of its people from the fact they were constantly fighting one another. War brought out the 
best in men, and with it came freedom – or so the Florentine scholar believed.7 Undoubtedly, 
the relationship between violence and European identity/ies, even in its liberal version, needs 
to be rethought. And one useful point of departure might be the relationship between different 
views on war and notions of progress and decline in the years of the ‘sceptical and apathetic’ 
Europe.  
 
 
 
Degeneration, progress, and war: Max Nordau and European unity 
 
That in the age of Europe’s greatest cultural, political, and economic achievements, at the 
climax of its commercial and diplomatic power, the language of intellectual and scientific 
circles was heavily influenced by notions of degeneration and decadence might seem a 
paradox. Indeed, in those years ideas of progress and modernity, so tightly associated with 
Europe, came to be entwined with images of its decline.8 The greater the level of European 
industrialization and the greater its wealth, the more its morals were threatened. The Janus-
faced monster of modernity had improved the material condition of millions of individuals 
across Europe, and yet, at the same time, it seemed to have voided their lives of all meaning. 
According to some observers, it was a contradiction that manifested itself in the growth of 
mental illnesses – a threat that psychology, another nascent product of modernity, was trying 
to contain.9 The publication of Max Nordau’s Entartung (1892–1893), soon translated from 
German into every other major European language and a short-lived yet intense publishing 
success, was one of the many indictments of such a condition. As one scholar commented, 
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Entartung threw ‘a chill upon the last years of the fin-de-siècle’, causing a greater commotion 
than any other book written between 1890 and 1900.10 Even George Bernard Shaw, who in 
an article published in 1895 went to great lengths to refute Nordau’s theories, later had to 
admit how influential they had been.11 In general, reactions were critical, and most 
commentators condemned the views expressed in Entartung – though they could not be 
lightly dismissed. In fact, even if the thesis was controversial, it seemed based on sound 
knowledge and thorough research. In his review of the book, William James went as far as to 
call Nordau an ‘idiot’, an ‘imbecile’, and ‘gloomily insane’; but he also had to admit that he 
was ‘really learned’ in German, French, and English literature as well as in neurology and 
psychology.12  
Building in part on Paul Bourget’s psychological theory of decadence, Nordau argued 
that degeneration was a condition common to civilized nations and that it manifested itself, 
above all, in the arts.13 Considering the works of Charles Baudelaire, Oscar Wilde, Paul 
Verlaine, Henrik Ibsen, Leo Tolstoy, Richard Wagner, Friedrich Nietzsche, and many other 
great novelists and artists, Nordau saw in them the expression of a nervous distress and 
exhaustion produced by modernity and leading to various forms of neuroses. It was a 
condition caused by the frenetic and unsustainable rhythms of modern life and by the 
difficulties met by some individuals in adapting to rapid urbanization and industrialization. 
The artist was the spokesman of degeneration, his fanatical audience feeding his delusion. 
Importantly, ‘the black death of degeneration and hysteria’ unfolding before his eyes was a 
phenomenon common to the people of Europe rather than of western civilization as a 
whole.14 In fact, during an interview in 1896, Nordau made it clear that his idea of 
degeneration could not be applied to America. Eulogizing Brett Hart as the greatest living 
American novelists, he praised the novelty of his stories, all set in ‘new surroundings’ and 
portraying heroic adventurers and daring gold-seekers – places and men that, for Nordau, 
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were distant from the chaotic and soulless metropolis of modern and industrialized Europe.15 
That degeneration was a predominantly European phenomenon seems to be confirmed in the 
opening pages of another work by Nordau, Die konventionellen Lügen der Kulturmenschheit, 
published in 1883 and soon translated into English, French, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, 
Russian, Turkish, Greek, Japanese, and Chinese. Anticipating some of the ideas in Entartung, 
Nordau claimed that England, Germany, Italy, Spain, and even the smaller nations in Europe 
were all experiencing an unprecedented moral decline. Social ties were being threatened, and 
so was political stability. Even France, though it might ‘congratulate itself upon the best 
condition of political health of any European country’, was in disarray. On every street, 
‘excited orators are preaching the gospel of Communism and violence’. The masses would 
soon ignite a war of unparalleled violence ‘to drive the ruling bourgeoisie out of their snug 
offices and sinecures’.16 As a critical admirer of modern civilization and a believer in 
bourgeois values and ways of life, Nordau shunned such a view with horror. And yet he held 
out hope in a better future for, he wrote, humanity was destined to ‘elevation and not 
degradation’.17 In fact, according to Nordau the majority of the peoples of Europe, their 
middle and lower classes, were still ‘sound’.18 The degenerate would not survive the 
conditions of modernity, and a new man capable of withstanding its pace would finally 
prevail. There was little space or need for politics, since degeneration would come to an end 
thanks to the struggle for existence and the individual’s capacity to adapt.19 Such views were 
consistent with those outlined in the final pages of Entartung, where Nordau wrote of 
freedom, hard work, the sciences, discipline, and (bourgeois) social values as the cure to 
Europe’s illnesses.20 
The ideas that Nordau set forth in his Paradoxe, a book first published in 1885, were 
more sombre. Lingering at length on the future of European civilization, he claimed that 
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peace among its nations would only stem from a cataclysm that would tear apart most of 
Europe:  
 
The twentieth century can hardly come to an end without seeing the conclusion of this 
drama in world history. Before then, a considerable portion of Europe will see much 
distress and bloodshed, many acts of violence and crimes. […] Valiant armies will 
gloriously perish in the fight. However, from then onwards the survivors will enjoy the 
full possession of their national rights.21 
 
Since they belonged to the same racial stock, the peoples of Europe would gradually attain 
the same level of military capacity and this, in turn, would assure that any war between them 
would lead to utter mutual destruction. Peace would then ensue. Gradually strengthening their 
cultural ties, the nations of Europe would eventually come to share common ways of life and 
values. However, while war would become impossible and even unthinkable on the Old 
Continent, the demographic pressure of its peoples would push the European man further on 
in his conquest and exploitation of the rest of the globe. His success would be secured by his 
technological and racial superiority – the former being a consequence of the latter. Finally, 
‘the entire earth will be subject to the plough and locomotive of the sons of Europe’.22 In 
many ways, it was a view compatible with Schmitt’s later reading of European history. 
Violence would be tamed and even suppressed within Europe – an outcome of technological 
progress – and the destructive power of its nations used for the exploitation and colonization 
of the rest of the world. Here was an imperialistic and messianic view of a united Europe to 
which other authors still held during the First World War.23 Importantly, it was even a 
refutation of the liberal narrative that considered trade and economy as the engine of 
European unification. Progress would end war in Europe because of fear rather than 
commercial interests or mutual understanding. At the same time, progress would create the 
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conditions for quenching the implacable thirst for space and resources and by subduing other 
civilizations.  
Nordau returned once again to the relationship between progress, economic unification, 
and peace in an article published at the end of 1899 in the North American Review and 
entitled ‘Philosophy and Morals of War’. Commenting on Herbert Spencer’s belief that the 
history of civilization was an evolution from war to industry and that the two were 
antithetical, Nordau was adamant that they were ‘not necessarily such’.24 As he saw it, war 
was not always repealed by commerce, finance, and trade. For industrialization to be a means 
to end war, ‘an equality of evolution must exist between all peoples who have reached the 
industrial phase of civilisation’. However, he saw this as a ‘greater utopia than eternal peace 
through general altruism’.25 His article was a response to a speech made by the industrialist 
and pacifist Jan Bloch at a at the first Hague Peace Conference and his attempt to prove that 
war would be been impossible among great powers because of the financial and commercial 
losses to all combatants. According to Nordau, emotions would still prevail.26 A few years 
later, in his famous The Great Illusion (1910), Norman Angell presented arguments 
reminiscent of Bloch’s. For his part, the Italian scholar Giovanni Amendola, reviewing 
Angell’s book, insisted like Nordau that countries only rarely took into account economic 
interests, still preferring the ‘philosophy’ of risk and struggle.27 However, while Amendola 
seemed delighted by such a prospect, Nordau only despondently admitted to this reality: 
‘[E]motion which sustains the warlike tendencies of cultured men is stronger than religion, 
which preaches love to one’s neighbour; stronger than philosophy, which teaches the 
irrationality of brute force; stronger than morals and right, which the civilised man pretends 
to recognize as the leading powers of his life.’ Such a condition would persist as long as 
cooperation did not replace competition as the spring of progress.28 Importantly, it was an 
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indictment of a cardinal principle of social Darwinism, one at odds with the ideas Nordau had 
expressed in his Entartung.29 
 
 
 
Decadence and redemption: Nietzsche, war and the idea of Europe 
 
Other authors, writing between the 1870s and the 1890s, had different views about the place 
of war and the meaning of violence in European history. For some, war was itself the engine 
of progress and it therefore defined the very essence of the European man. They assumed that 
war allowed him to fully express his noble nature, while peace and material wealth made him 
selfish and inconsiderate. They also assumed that war bore an extraordinary integrating force 
and was essential for shaping a multitude of individuals into a single national community. 
Perhaps surprisingly, among those who subscribed to such views was the great novelist Émile 
Zola. In an article published in 1892, he claimed: ‘War is a sombre necessity, just like death. 
It is necessary that there be some manure for civilisation to flourish.’30 Elsewhere he went 
even further: ‘War is life itself! Nothing exists in nature, nor is anything born or grows other 
than by struggle. One must feed and be eaten for the world to live.’31 By 1899 he disavowed 
such ideas, denied that war could have any progressive role, and had turned into a convinced 
advocate of disarmament and European unification.32 Even Fyodor Dostoyevsky believed 
that the sacrifices demanded by war were beneficial to both the individual and his 
community. In his diary, he criticized the pacifists and their ‘bourgeois moralising!’. As he 
saw it, the ‘feat of sacrificing blood for all that we consider sacred is, of course, more moral 
than this entire bourgeois catechism’.33 It was not war but peace that ‘bestializes and hardens 
people’, paving the way ‘to cruelty, cowardice, and coarse, bloated egoism and, above all, to 
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intellectual stagnation’.34 In 1877, Dostoyevsky claimed that Europe was in a state of 
decadence and that all values had been lost to the shallowness of bourgeois materialism.35 He 
foresaw an impending war that would decide the fate of France and Germany, solve the 
Eastern Question, and even settle the relationship between Europe and Islam. It would be a 
tremendous conflict, of unprecedented violence, in which ‘so much precious blood would be 
shed’. However, that blood would ‘certainly spare Europe from ten times more bloodshed 
should the matter be postponed’. The face of the continent would change forever, and this last 
‘convolution of the old Europe’ would announce its ‘great and certain renewal’.36 Even the 
historian Jacob Burckhardt believed that war was the engine of progress, a ‘necessary factor 
for a higher development’.37 As a critic of modern massification and individualization, he 
contended that protracted peace weakened the body politic and could lead to its collapse.38 
War, which required the ‘subjection of all life and property to one momentary aim’, he saw as 
vastly superior to peace since it tamed egoism and strengthened the social fabric by 
subjecting all men to a ‘supreme general idea’. It was this, in turn, that made it possible for 
‘the heroic virtue to unfold’.39 Although he was not a militarist, Burckhardt believed that war 
was necessary to progress and stressed how the greatest eras of cultural achievement had not 
always been times of peace. Wars and political strife had often been times of great ‘vitality’, 
and intellectual and artistic accomplishments.40 Division and struggle were inextricably tied 
to cultural achievements. And here, according to Burckhardt, lay the source of Europe’s 
greatness. He saw it as the ‘home of all contrasts which dissolve into the one unity’, a space 
with uncertain boundaries where struggle never ended; the place of a ‘discordia concors’ that 
in the past had led to those great accomplishments – and those appalling wars – that formed 
European history.41  
The works of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche have influenced notions of European 
decadence and ideas of regeneration through war more than those of any other thinker.42 
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Because of the fragmentary nature of his writings and considering that between the 
publication of the Geburt der Tragödie (1872) and the writing of Ecce homo (1888; published 
posthumously) some of his views changed at a remarkable pace, his texts have often been 
misinterpreted and misread. In part, this explains the success of various forms of 
Nietzscheanism in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. It also explains why political 
and intellectual movements so different in nature and aims – including anarchism, socialism, 
Futurism, Marxism, and, most infamously, National socialism – referred to his works and, 
more or less explicitly, to his idea that European society would head to its demise if left to 
itself.43 Indeed, Nietzsche was adamant that Europe was in a disconcerting state of 
decadence: ‘For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving as toward a 
catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, 
violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is 
afraid to reflect.’44 However, unlike other prophets of decadence, Nietzsche argued that the 
one unfolding before his eyes was simply a phase of a process that had started long ago, with 
the end of the ‘tragic’ element in Greek thought destroyed by Socrates’s faith in the 
omnipotence of reason.45 Within Nietzsche’s scheme, Christianity was a new phase of decline 
that dovetailed with the optimism of post-Socratic thought. It was a religion of the weak, 
preaching peace at all costs and teaching to despise pleasure, pride, and beauty. Moreover, 
Judaeo-Christian morality, originating in the East and essentially alien to the European 
classical mind, had produced a movement that from the outset had been ‘a general uprising of 
all sorts of outcast and refuse elements’ – a sort of first rebellion of the masses.46 Modern 
Europe was now facing a new danger. The ‘death of God’, proclaimed by the madman in Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft in the face of general indifference, meant that nothing any more had 
value or meaning.47 According to Nietzsche, here was the beginning of European nihilism, of 
a devaluation of all the highest values that had been the basis of European society and that 
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essentially stemmed from the Christian understanding of God.48 Human reason and the 
sciences alone were unable to found a new set of values detached from all metaphysical 
belief.49 As a consequence, a feeling of meaninglessness was taking hold of the European 
mind, so that the most universal sign of modernity was that ‘man has lost dignity in his own 
eyes to an incredible extent’.50 Modernity, which Nietzsche equated with European 
civilization itself, was a ‘time of extensive inner decay and disintegration, a time that with all 
its weaknesses, and also with its best strength, opposes the spirit of youth. Disintegration 
characterises this time, and hence uncertainty.’51  
As is often the case with Nietzschean notions, there was another side to nihilism.52 The 
great German philosopher made clear in 1887, in a fragment later included in the Wille zur 
Macht (1901; posthumous), that ‘the symptoms of decline belong in the times of tremendous 
advances; every fruitful and powerful movement of humanity has also created at the same 
time a nihilistic movement. It could be the sign of a crucial and most essential growth, of the 
transition to new conditions of existence, that the most extreme form of pessimism, genuine 
nihilism, would come into the world.’53 The ‘death of God’ produced by the will to truth 
meant that, freed from the lies of metaphysics and of Judeo-Christian morality, man could 
now create his own values. So, ‘at hearing the news that “the old god is dead”, we 
philosophers and “free spirits” feel illuminated by a new dawn; our heart overflows with 
gratitude, amazement, forebodings, expectation’.54 It was the devaluation of all principles that 
allowed the creation of notions such as the Übermensch and the shaping of new values that 
went beyond good and evil. But the process would be slow and painful. According to 
Nietzsche, not all men would complete the journey, and those who did not would remain part 
of the herd. Fear in the face of the new challenge could be arresting. The false need for a 
transcendental grounding of morals, the outcome of two millennia of Christianity, would 
survive as an impediment on the path to freedom. The dead God would continue to be 
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venerated by many, and still ‘we would have to defeat his shadow’, Nietzsche wrote.55 
European nihilism was a condition for transcending Christian morality, and on the ‘free 
spirits’ he bestowed the responsibility for creating the values to overcome nihilism itself.56 
Their capacity to overcome resistance would make their lives worth living.57 Crucially, the 
strife would not be only of a philosophical or intellectual nature. When truth ‘enters into 
battle with the lies of millennia, we shall have convulsions, a spasm of earthquakes, a 
displacing of mountain and valley the like of which has never been dreamed. The concept of 
politics will then be completely taken up with spiritual warfare, all the power structures of the 
old society will be blown sky high – they all rest on lies: there will be wars like never before 
on earth.’58 
The reference to war as the means of overcoming nihilism and shaping the new European 
man is crucial. In general, Nietzsche was among those who believed that, in specific 
circumstances, war had a cathartic power.59 In a fragment of his Menschliches, 
Allzumenschliches, tellingly entitled ‘War essential’, he stated that if mankind should ever 
learn ‘not to wage war, then one could no longer expect much from it’. Indeed, he argued that 
the ancient Romans and modern-day Englishmen, tired of waging war, had sought other 
means to regenerate their fading strength, seeking them in the fights of the gladiators and 
dangerous and daring explorations respectively. However, he went on, soon the futility of 
searching for surrogates for war would prove ever more clearly that such a highly cultivated 
civilization ‘as that of present-day Europe, needs not only wars but the greatest and most 
terrible wars (that is, occasional relapses into barbarism)’.60 In Also sprach Zarathustra, he 
went even further: ‘What is good? To be brave is good. It is the good war that halloweth 
every cause.’61 Because of such remarks and for the importance he gave to struggle in general 
– on and outside of the battlefield – some commentators considered Nietzsche to be a pitiless 
jingoist. Among them was Nordau, who saw him prophesizing, ‘exultingly, that for Europe 
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there will soon begin an era of brass, an era of war, soldiers, arms, violence’.62 In truth, if 
Nietzsche seemed elated by the prospect of future wars, it was only because he saw in them a 
chance for overcoming European nihilism. War could be a remedy for those peoples that had 
become weak and senile. The shock of struggle would lead them to a fuller and more 
vigorous existence.63 From war, Nietzsche believed, man could emerge ‘with greater 
strength, for good and evil’.64 
War could redeem Europe by replacing the principle of happiness, dominating modern 
democratic societies, with the capacity to establish a hierarchy between needs, desires, and 
values now lost in the age of nihilism. According to Nietzsche, although war was not always 
positive in and of itself, it certainly was in the case of late nineteenth-century Europe, when 
the false idol of nationalism had led to an unprecedented militarization: ‘I am glad about the 
military development of Europe as well as of the internal state of anarchy. The time of repose 
and Chinese ossification, which Galiani predicted for this century, is over. […] The barbarian 
in each of us is affirmed and so is the wild beast. Precisely for such reason, philosophers have 
a future.’65 That future wars would be a spiritual as much as a real struggle, fought on the 
battlefield, was confirmed by a fragment written in 1884: ‘The consequences of my teaching 
must rage furiously: but on its account countless many shall die.’66 The outcome of the long 
and uncertain journey would be the Übermensch. In fact, separating the Übermensch from 
‘the last man’ – that is, the last human sort before the beast entirely dominated by desire – 
were the three human types described in Also sprach Zarathustra (1883–1891): the ‘camel’, 
the ‘lion’, and the ‘child spirit’, which embodied, respectively, the believer bearing the 
burden, the destroyer, and the innocent who has no memory nor rage. Each new stage would 
require a new hierarchy of passions and, therefore, a fight and struggle. The metamorphosis 
from the ‘camel’ into the ‘lion spirit’ would be an age of devastation, when the remnants of 
Christianity as well as the new false idols created to replace it would be destroyed. It would 
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be a struggle for freedom. As Nietzsche explained in the Götzen-Dämmerung (1889), ‘The 
man who has become free – and how much more the spirit which has become free – treads 
underfoot the contemptible species of well-being dreamt of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, 
women, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free man is a warrior.’67 Out of the 
aristocracy of free warrior-philosophers would arise the ‘child spirit’ and then the 
Übermensch.68 Only after tremendous wars, ‘like never before on earth’, might true peace 
arise: 
 
Perhaps a memorable day will come when a people renowned in wars and victories, 
distinguished by the highest development of military order and intelligence, and 
accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifice to these objects, will voluntarily exclaim, ‘We 
will break our swords’, and will destroy its whole military system, lock, stock, and barrel. 
Making ourselves defenceless (after having been the most strongly defended) from a 
loftiness of sentiment – that is the means towards genuine peace, which must always rest 
upon a pacific disposition. […] Better to perish than to hate and fear, and twice as far 
better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared.69  
 
Because nihilism was a distinctly European phenomenon, the outcome of a unique history so 
different from that of any other civilization, the wars to come would lead to a regeneration of 
Europe as a whole, beyond national distinctions.70 Consistently, Nietzsche dismissed 
nationalism as one of the new idols replacing Christianity, as a falsification of Europe’s past, 
and an absurd fetter to making of Europe what it really willed to be:  
 
Thanks to the pathological manner in which nationalist nonsense has alienated and 
continues to alienate the peoples of Europe from each other, thanks as well to the short-
sighted and swift-handed politicians who have risen to the top with the help of this 
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nonsense […] the most unambiguous signs declaring that Europe wants to be one are 
either overlooked or wilfully and mendaciously reinterpreted.71  
 
Emerging from Nietzsche’s vision of the relationship between Europe and its nations was the 
need to overcome the latter and firmly assert the former. In effect, signs of a cultural unity 
among its elites were already emerging, and the ‘good Europeans’, who like Nietzsche 
himself were immune to the follies of nationalism, were growing in number.72 Crucially, 
Nietzsche’s Europe would not be the product of a federation or some sort of political 
agreement – though he did refer to such a possibility.73 Nor would it be united merely 
through violence. Only a destructive/constructive violence, a struggle led by a new 
aristocracy of the spirit and the body, could regenerate the European mind and restore to the 
peoples of Europe their strength. It would do so, in a typically Nietzschean twist, through one 
of the great idols destined to perish in the fight. As he made clear in a fragment of his Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft, entitled ‘Our faith in a remasculinisation of Europe’, ‘[t]he classic 
age of war, of sophisticated yet popular war on the largest scale’ had begun thanks to 
Napoleon. He should have been credited for ‘having enabled man, in Europe, to become the 
master over the businessman and the philistine’. Having brought war back to Europe and 
having restored its ancient sacredness, and since he ‘wanted one Europe and wanted it as 
mistress of the earth’, Nietzsche counted Napoleon among the good Europeans.74 The only 
possible Europe, according to the German philosopher, would be the one shaped by the 
aristocracy of the warrior-philosophers, through their struggle and thanks to their will.  
 
 
 
Progress and the death of the hero: Europe in the early writings of Paul Valéry 
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In the history of images, discourses, and ideas of Europe, Paul Valéry is often remembered 
for his ‘La crise de l’esprit’ – and rightly so. Formed of two letters, first published in England 
in the spring of 1919, it is one of the greatest works of that literature of crisis flourishing in 
the 1920s and 1930s.75 In the opening lines of the first letter, the great French poet noted that 
the war had made it clear that, just like any other civilization, Europe was mortal, its 
existence as frail as human life. Its greatness and uniqueness were historical facts destined to 
end very soon: ‘the abyss of history is big enough for the entire world’.76 But the war, rather 
than being the cause of Europe’s decadence, was the inevitable outcome of its inner 
ambiguities, of the contradictory ‘coexistence in the cultivated minds of the most different 
ideas, of the most contrasting principles of life and knowledge’.77 However, this chaotic mix 
of ideas and values was at the very heart of modernity – or so believed Valéry. It was a point 
he pursued by making of Shakespeare’s Hamlet the personification of the ‘modern 
European’, the hero who, under the weight of knowledge, meditates over ‘the life and death 
of truths’.78 It was the underlying contradiction that led Valéry to wonder whether ‘the 
Europe of 1914 might have reached the end of this modernism’.79 It was a civilization now 
lost to itself and in need of a future but, most of all, in need of a past. As he claimed a few 
years later, Europe had to find once again its roots; it needed to recover its Greco-Roman and 
Christian-Judaic heritage.80 But, according to Valéry, in 1919 the question was whether 
Europe would maintain its prominence or, borrowing an expression from Nietzsche, ‘become 
what it really is, a small cape of Asia’.81 The discrepancy between its limited resources and 
its role in world history had finally emerged.  
That the war, rather than being the cause of Europe’s decadence, was the inevitable 
outcome of its inner contradictions was a view to which Valéry held long afterwards: ‘The 
Great War was what it had to be: it emphasised and hastened European decadence.’82 A 
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symptom more than a cause of Europe’s twilight, the war had finally unveiled the deep-
seated contradictions at the heart of its civilization. Interestingly, such views had already 
emerged long before 1914. Retrospectively, Valéry came to see the ideas in the ‘Crise de 
l’esprit’ as the germination of impressions already present in his ‘Le Yalou’ (1895), a short 
story in which he fiercely criticized European society and gloomily foresaw its end.83 There 
were many faults for which he reproached Europe, but a crucial one was the misguided 
rejection of tradition. In the age of modernity, the European man had incessantly gone against 
his own past, thus severing the ties with his origins and finally producing a civilization 
divided against itself. Asking how long he could continue rejecting his past was not a 
rhetorical question.84 Such a condition was tied to the fact that Europe was endowed with a 
universal mission that made it special, absorbing the knowledge of other civilizations, 
transforming that knowledge, and disseminating new ideas and principles. Here lay the roots 
of its scientific, technological, economic, and political greatness. These were the roots of a 
(European) modernity spreading throughout the globe. And yet, here was also the cause of 
Europe’s downfall. The Sino-Japanese war, which had prompted the writing of ‘Le Yalou’, 
had seen the triumph of a non-European country armed and organized following the 
teachings of European nations. According to Valéry, it signalled the poisonous dissemination 
of European sciences and technology. The world was experiencing a massification and 
levelling of knowledge that would ultimately cancel Europe’s advantage over other 
civilizations, inevitably bringing about its end. It was a concern Valéry expressed two years 
later, in 1897, to the future Nobel Peace Prize laureate d’Estournelles de Constant.85 Thanks 
only to its genius, Europe had been able to counterpoise its lack in strength and numbers. The 
inequality between different civilizations and nations in the sciences and instruments of war, 
an inequality on which Europe had built its predominance, would inevitably disappear. In the 
future, the place of each civilization in the world would be determined by ‘the gross material 
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size, the statistical elements, numbers’.86 Once more, there was a remarkable continuity in 
Valéry’s thought, from ‘Le Yalou’ to ‘La crise de l’esprit’, emerging still in his Cahiers in 
1945: ‘Germany dies, and with it, Europe […]. My “theorem” in the “Crise de l’esprit” – 
Europe’s power laid in its technical monopole. Having given up such a treasure, the masses 
became preponderant and powers were classified according to the quantitative order.’87 
Valéry’s ‘Theory of levelling’ made the case for a form of globalization that, starting on 
the Old Continent, opposed the plurality and complexity defining the European mind and 
created the conditions for its own demise. The notion was restated in a short essay entitled 
‘Une conquête méthodique’, published in 1897 in the New Review and later republished with 
a different title during the Great War to support the Allies’ war effort.88 The kernel of 
Valéry’s argument was that the military victories of Germany could be understood only if 
they were seen as ‘part of the same system’ that ensured its economic successes.89 Its 
greatness was the consequence of the acceptance of a ‘method’, of a soulless and 
dispassionate reflection; the result of a ‘disciplined intelligence’ that did not rely on ingenuity 
and rejected unexpected illuminations.90 It was the outcome of the modern industrial logic 
acting through a whole nation rather than through individuals. The Germans were united in 
their efforts to win on the battlefield or to gain new markets – between the two, Valéry saw 
little difference. Commercial interests were pursued in the same way as military objectives: 
‘just as troops must arrive as numerous as possible [on the battlefield], products must arrive 
at the lowest possible cost’ on the market. Such a brute and disciplined force, turning 
certainty and calculation into its most important weapon and overlooking no detail to attain 
its goals, seemed ‘in peace more fearful than in war’.91 According to Valéry, General 
Helmuth von Moltke was the personification of such a system. Making use in the fullest of all 
modern technologies, he subjected the energies of the whole nation to a single aim, that of 
winning the war. Daring and luck, which had been valued by generals and commandants for 
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centuries, now became the greatest enemy of warfare. Considered from such a viewpoint, 
what the method required was ‘a real mediocrity of the individual’. The only qualities worthy 
of praise were in fact patience, precision, and attention – clearly, not the qualities of great 
heroes. Individual abilities had to be mediocre to ensure the success of the nation as a whole: 
‘There, heroic times are passed; they have been deliberately closed.’92 Following such logic, 
war itself could only be declared when victory was a mathematic certainty. It was no longer 
an unpredictable duel between nations. But Valéry made the case that such arguments were 
valid for all spheres of life of the German nation.93 Everything had to be certain, already 
determined; and just as there was no hero, there could be no genius. This levelling of the 
individual was a corollary of Valéry’s broader theory of the levelling of civilizations, and, 
although such a condition was more apparent in Germany, in some respects his essay might 
be considered an indictment of the whole of European society.  
The notion that there was little or no space for heroes or geniuses in modernity must have 
been profoundly discomforting for Valéry. In 1891, in a letter to his friend André Gide, he 
offered a rather disturbing praise of war and violence, clearly at odds with the pacifism of his 
later works:  
 
I desire an almost monstrous war where to escape to amidst the clash of a mad and 
red Europe, where to lose the memories and the respect for all writing and of all 
dreams in real visions, gloomy stampings of tapping hoofs and tearing of gunfire, 
and to never return! I do not know what blood speaks in me, nor which wolf of 
ancient times yawns in my ennui, but I feel it here! The hideous mechanical 
literature sickens me, and all life is not worth it. Does this barbarian surprise you?94  
 
Gide himself might have thought of Valéry’s wishes as little more than artistic musing.95 In 
effect, there are few explicit references to the regenerative power of war in his works. Yet his 
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idea of an ‘oddly constructive nihilism’ surfacing time and again in the history of the west 
evokes, as has been noted, the ‘apocalyptic principle of death and rebirth, of deconstruction 
for the infinite reconstruction’.96 Valéry became a pacifist only much later. In two letters to 
d’Estournelles de Constant of 1899 and 1900, although he used less enthusiastic tones and set 
forth more realistic considerations, he still stressed the inevitability of a European war. He 
saw it as the consequence of progress and the outcome of that levelling of qualities that 
modernity carried within it; a process that, having laid the basis of Europe’s greatness, was 
now turning into the cause of its downfall.97  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
When looking at the early works of Valéry and comparing them with his later writings on 
Europe, the contrast is striking; even more so since his unconditional pessimism of the 1890s 
seemed to give way to (some) hope after the First World War. Of course, his fears over 
Europe’s decline remained constant throughout his life, as did his distrust towards the values 
of modern, materialistic, bourgeois society. However, he did not only come to recognize that 
politics could be a valid means of avoiding war. More importantly, he started to believe that a 
certain idea of Europe, one built on those values lost to modernity, might gradually take hold. 
This, he contended, would be the outcome of the action of an intellectual and cultural elite. 
The new Europe would be built – in what may seem a paradox – not on the rejection but on 
the recognition of its past. It was a markedly elitist view, based on faith in the capacity of a 
few enlightened men to achieve a colossal aim. It sharply contrasted with his gloomy image 
of modern Europe as a whole. Comparing the ideas in Valéry’s early writing with those in 
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Nordau’s, there emerges, in the latter, the idea of a superiority of European civilization that 
the French philosopher would have dismissed with scorn. In fact, according to Nordau, 
Europe’s global political and military hegemony was dictated by nature; for the French 
philosopher, it was a historical matter destined to end. It was Nordau’s understanding of a 
European racial unity and superiority that enabled him to envisage a bright (distant) future for 
Europe. Dismissing the liberal vulgate and its visions of perpetual peace and economic 
integration as utopian, he was convinced that technological progress and the threat of mutual 
destruction would one day unite the Old Continent. Progress and fear would cement Europe 
into a single polity. Unlike Valéry, Nordau refrained from assigning to any elite, whether 
political or intellectual, a salvific role. Again in contrast to Valéry, he praised the values of 
the bourgeoisie, claiming that the future global hegemony of the European man would be the 
work of the middle and lower classes, the strong and vigorous backbone of European society. 
As for Nietzsche, although he firmly rejected the liberal discourse on European unification, 
he did so on a very different basis than Nordau. Rather than progress and the threat of mutual 
destruction, war fought on the battlefields throughout the small ‘cape of Asia’ would bring 
about European unity. Crucially, the struggle would not be fought along national divides. 
Standing opposed to the warrior-philosophers, bearers of the new values that went beyond 
good and evil, would be the masses and the forces of conservation. The rejection of 
nationalism and the assumption that modernity and decadence were indissolubly tied to – or 
even coincided with – the history of European civilization make of Nietzsche’s an eminently 
Europeanist perspective. Of course, more than any other author, he argued for the cathartic 
power of war, and his works helped spread such a notion in the first half of the twentieth 
century. But the important aspect, here, is that his redemptive war could only take place in 
Europe. In turn, though this depended on the nature and the outcome of the struggle, only 
Europe could be the place where a new kind of history would unravel – a history without 
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false idols, violence, or rage. In this sense, Nietzsche’s views, though less optimistic than 
Nordau’s, were more positive than Valéry’s. Nordau, Nietzsche, and the young Valéry, set 
forth three different views of Europe, each one built on a different reading of progress and 
connected in a different way to war. They were united by their rejection of the liberal vulgate. 
All three denied that interest could unite the peoples of Europe and sought in an alleged racial 
unity (Nordau) or the overcoming of European history (Nietzsche) or its rethinking (Valéry) 
the basis of unification. In doing so, they contributed to the debates about Europe on the eve 
of the First World War and in its aftermath. Their ideas, and those of the many others who 
rejected exceedingly optimistic discourses on European unification, depict a dark and gloomy 
notion that might shed new light on twentieth-century intellectual history.  
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